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**Summary Report**  
**SR-TZ-sds-96**

**Tanzania**

***Service delivery survey (SDS) in Tanzania***

CIETinternational

## **Tanzania: Corruption In The Police, Judiciary, Revenue And Lands Services**

*"Serikali nitakayounda baada ya uchaguzi haitakuwa na msamaha wala haitasita kuchukua hatua kali pale ambapo pana uvundo wa baa la rushwa".*

"The Government I will form after the elections shall have no excuse at all and will not hesitate to take stern actions in all places where there is corruption".

Benjamin Mkapa, presidential election campaign 1995.

The Presidential Commission on Corruption, formed by President Benjamin Mkapa after he came into office in November 1995, requested a Service Delivery Survey (SDS) in 1996 to investigate the extent of corruption in the delivery of public services. The four services included in this first SDS were the police, the judiciary, revenue and lands services. There was a general perception corruption in these four key services was commonplace.

The SDS used a cross-design methodology known as Sentinel Community Surveillance. This community-based information management system provides a cost effective way of collecting data on impact, coverage and costs of services in a form that can be used for planning at local, regional and national levels. Quantitative and coterminous qualitative data from representative sites are combined to give figures reflecting the local and national situation.

The aim of the SDS was to provide baseline data on the extent of corruption in the everyday delivery of the key services, providing indicators that could be remeasured later to assess the impact of measures to reduce the problem. Another aim was to assist in efforts to tackle the problem of corruption in public services, by stimulating dialogue on the problem and its solutions between service users and service providers at different levels. To this end, this report includes the views about the community level results of the communities themselves

and of the senior Officers in the sample Districts and their suggestions for dealing with the problem.

A community survey was undertaken in 40 representative communities (sites) in 10 Districts throughout Tanzania. Selection of the sample sites was by a process of stratification and a final purposive sampling. In each site of about 120 households, a household questionnaire was administered, covering use and experience of the four services. In the same sites, key informants were interviewed and focus group discussions about experiences of corruption in public services were held. The results of the survey were fed back to each community and to the District Administration in each of the 10 sample Districts; their views were sought about the results and about what could be done to tackle the problem

A short questionnaire was administered to a random sample of 10-20 workers from the four services in each District. This sought their views about what constitutes corruption and about reporting and dealing with corruption.

Data were computerised and preliminary analysis undertaken in each District; more detailed analysis was undertaken with the combined data from all Districts.

Household information came from a total of 4,561 households (24,676 people). The household head was male in 82% of households, a peasant farmer in 80%, and had had some education in 77%. Among the households, 7% had contacted the police in the last year, 5% the judiciary, 4% revenue services and 1% lands services. Contacts were more frequent in urban sites and in sites where the services were closer at hand. Nearly all reported service contacts were by personal visit.

Some few households reported using the traditional guards or council of elders instead of or as well as the police and judiciary. These services

were more likely to have been used by households in sites where the key informant indicated they were present and active.

Indicators of the performance of the four services, obtained from the responses of households who had used them, are shown in Table 1. Many people expressed dissatisfaction with the services, both in the household questionnaire and in focus group discussions. Among those who reported use of the services, less than half were satisfied with the speed of the service or the behaviour of the service staff. Less than a third of those not satisfied with the service knew how to complain; few of those who knew how to complain actually did so. The majority of service users (up to 82%) were given some sort of information about using the service but only about a third (except for revenue services) found it helpful. More than a third of users saw more than two service workers and most (except for revenue) had to make more than two visits.

The main complaint about services in focus group discussions was that people have to pay for these services, which ought to be available free of charge. From the household questionnaire, reported payment to service workers was indeed common but not universal (35% police, 32% judiciary, 39% revenue and 25% lands). The payment was said to be in response to a request from the service worker in 93% of cases.

Unsolicited bribes may be less likely to be reported. The average bribe paid was 13,919/- for police, 28,769/- for judiciary, 14,437/- for revenue and 107,395/- for lands services. Users who paid requested bribes reported a slower service and were likely to have seen more staff than those who did not pay. They were less satisfied with the speed of the service and the behaviour of the staff.

The commonest view about the practice of paying extra to service workers was it was 'wrong' (78% of households). Anger and frustration about the situation were voiced in many focus groups. Asked their opinion of the level of corruption in public services in their District, 60% of households thought there was 'very much' corruption, 19% there was

a moderate level, 12% there was none at all, and 9% could not give an opinion. Among service users, those who had paid bribes were more likely to think there was 'very much' corruption; opinions are probably influenced by personal experiences. Corruption in public services was said (in focus groups) to deny justice, disadvantage the poor, destroy local economies and divide communities. People were said to avoid using the services because of the associated corruption.

In focus group discussions people gave their views of the causes of corruption in public services. They cited lack of action by government, low salaries of service workers and poor organisation of services. Some blamed service users for being willing to give bribes or for tempting workers. Greed of individual workers was also mentioned.

Common suggestions from households for solving the problem of corruption included: prosecution of corrupt people (31%); government 'action' (21%); increasing salaries (13%); disciplining or dismissing corrupt workers (12%); better information about services (8%) and reporting by citizens of corruption (6%). Similar views were elaborated in focus group discussions.

Another questionnaire was administered to 153 service workers. They had an average length of service of 16 years and 80% were male. Asked about the level of corruption in public services in the country, 57% of them thought it was 'very much', 40% 'moderate' and only 3% 'none at all'. Two out of three thought corruption had increased in the last five years.

The reaction of service workers to statements about issues related to corruption indicated more than half thought something could not be corrupt if it was done for the right reasons. Also, more than half believed people who report corruption are likely to suffer for it; a belief that will discourage reporting. A quarter saw nothing wrong with private companies giving gifts to workers to attract business and a

quarter thought most corruption was too trivial to be worth reporting. More than 90% thought the behaviour of a hypothetical fellow worker who regularly requested 'chai' was undesirable, harmful, unjustifiable and corrupt. But few said they would report to the supervisor or outside the service.

District meetings to discuss the survey results were held in each of the ten sample Districts, except Mwanza because of local circumstances. There was general agreement that corruption included giving or receiving something to provide or facilitate a service or favour. The public perception of a high level of corruption in public services was accepted but in some Districts it was suggested the perception may be exaggerated or distorted.

Low salaries and poor conditions of service were given as reasons for corruption in public services generally. Specific problems were noted for the different services such as: recruitment procedures for the police; problems with court assessors (including non-payment of allowances) and poor understanding of legal processes for the judiciary; individualised tax assessments for revenue; and land and staff shortages for the lands service. There was broad agreement with the causes cited by communities.

Suggested solutions placed less emphasis on punishment of corrupt individuals than did the focus groups. Improved reporting with protection for reporters was suggested, together with education of the public about what their rights were in relation to the judiciary and other services. One District suggested the anti-corruption laws needed further tightening, another suggested the independence of the judiciary should be reviewed as it could be abused, while another suggested strengthening and formalising the traditional services such as the traditional guards and councils of elders.

Most of the Districts took responsibility for action as well as welcoming

and urging action from higher Government levels. Some made specific plans to take immediate actions on the basis of the reported results of the survey.

This Service Delivery Survey confirms anecdotal evidence that there is much petty corruption involved in the delivery of police, judiciary, revenue and lands services. Communities perceive a high level of corruption in these services and their experiences of individual contacts with them are often unsatisfactory. The survey has produced a number of indicators of performance of the services that can be used as a baseline for comparison with a future survey to evaluate the effects of remedial actions.

Payment of bribes to service workers was not associated in this survey with increased satisfaction or improved speed of service. This may be because nearly all the reported payments were solicited by the workers and may be part of the bureaucratic process. Unsolicited payments may actually facilitate quick and efficient service but were not reported by households in the survey.

There was a high level of agreement between service users, service workers and District Officers about the seriousness of the corruption problem. A number of suggested solutions were common to the communities and District officers. Many in both groups urged the Government should take strong action against corrupt individuals and to restructure services and processes so as to make corruption less likely to occur and more likely to be reported.

**Table 1. Performance indicators for police, judiciary, revenue and lands services**

Performance indicator	%Level of indicator for each service			
	Police	Judiciary	Revenue	Lands
Users satisfied with speed of service	40	37	49	30
Users satisfied with staff behaviour	35	36	42	31
Non-satisfied users knowing how to complain	29	31	17	28
Users seen within one day	71	60	79	50
Users given information about using service	73	72	67	82
Users finding information helpful (of those given information)	39	38	67	36
Users seeing no more than two staff	58	52	65	60
Users making no more than two visits	43	18	67	37
Users paying 'extra' to staff	35	32	39	25

The full report *Service Delivery Survey: Corruption in the Police, Judiciary, Revenue and Lands Services*. Presidential Commission on Corruption. Government of Tanzania/CIETinternational. Dar es Salaam 1966, forthcoming.